Locate the primary publication
Trace reposted text back to the earliest available source. Confirm that the signature belongs to the same message rather than a nearby post or attached screenshot.
Mirror canon · signed evidence
A mirror list is trustworthy only to the extent that its source, signing key and exact contents can be verified. This page explains the method without republishing a raw destination address or claiming continuous status.
What a list should contain
Multiple addresses can improve reachability, but quantity is not proof of authenticity. A useful canon records the complete hostnames, the time or version of the statement, the signing key fingerprint and enough context to distinguish a current announcement from an archived one.
A copied directory that removes the signature or publication history turns a verifiable statement into an unsupported claim. Even when every hostname is copied correctly, readers can no longer establish who issued the list or whether a later rotation replaced it.
Verification sequence
Trace reposted text back to the earliest available source. Confirm that the signature belongs to the same message rather than a nearby post or attached screenshot.
Compare all fingerprint characters with a value established independently. Do not trust a key merely because it was attached to the mirror list it is supposed to authenticate.
Line endings, added spaces or copied formatting can change signed bytes. Use the original file or clearsigned text and read the verifier output carefully.
Match the full value from the verified statement. A lookalike can preserve recognizable characters while changing the cryptographic destination entirely.
Determine whether the announcement adds a route, replaces an older route or revokes one. A historically valid address is not automatically current.
Store the statement hash, fingerprint and verification result so the check can be repeated when a route changes or conflicting lists appear.
Signal strength
| Signal | What it can support | What it cannot prove |
|---|---|---|
| 56-character v3 hostname | The string has the expected onion format | Who controls the service |
| Successful connection | A service answered on that route | That the responding service is genuine |
| Valid OpenPGP signature | The message matches one signing key | That the key belongs to the intended operator |
| Independently known fingerprint | The key can be tied to prior evidence | Future behavior or availability |
| Recent signed replacement | The signer issued a newer set of values | That every listed route is reachable now |
Conflicting lists
If two lists name different hostnames, compare their signing fingerprints, publication history and replacement language. Do not solve a conflict by choosing the page that loads fastest or looks most familiar. An unresolved identity conflict is a reason not to proceed.
Next check
The pre-access checklist condenses source, signature and hostname checks into one final pause before navigation.
Click-only route
This reference does not publish a destination address. The handoff starts in this tab only after you press the button.
A route is not a guarantee of availability, identity or safety.